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Abstract
Approximately 75% of weather-related accidents result in fatalities and are a
primary safety concern in aviation. This study attempted to understand how financial
motivation and time investment influence the length of time pilots fly into degraded
weather. The sunk-cost effect claims that financially motivated pilots would continue
longer when weather is encountered late in the flight. The results revealed that the
financially motivated pilots continued longer than the non-fmancially motivated pilots
when weather was encountered early in the flight. These results support the situation
assessment hypothesis and cognitive anchoring. Specifically, how pilots assess the
situation and utilize information obtained before making a decision can influence their
decisions. Further research is needed to understand this relationship to possibly reduce
the number of weather-related accidents and associated fatalities.
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Introduction
Overview of General Aviation (GA) Flight and Weather Information
Accident Example
On January 31, 2004, a pilot and two passengers boarded a Cessna 414A in
Honolulu, Hawaii and were scheduled to arrive at Hilo, Hawaii to pick up a patient.
Even though weather reports indicated visual and instrument meteorological conditions,
the pilot filed a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft
crashed into trees and mountainous terrain located 21 miles from the destination, nearby
Laupahoehoe. The accident investigation found that the pilot was current on all
certifications and the aircraft logbook showed no reason for mechanical failure.
Although the National Weather Service issued a weather advisory to all en route
pilots to notify them of the hazardous flying conditions; the pilot elected to fly a VFR
flight plan and ultimately flew into instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot's
decisions resulted in the deaths of the pilot and the two passengers on board the flight,
and became another data point in the legacy of weather-related aviation fatalities
(National Transportation Safety Board, LAX04FA113).
It is the pilot's responsibility to evaluate their experience and skill level as well as
the performance parameters of the aircraft to handle the conditions while flying.
Researchers have tried to answer the question of why some pilots purposefully or
accidentally fly in degraded weather conditions, yet the data remains equivocal. The
current investigation attempted to outline current theories associated with weather-related
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aviation accidents, and test possible theories as to why some pilots fly into degraded
weather.
GA Background: Accident and Fatalities
Many general aviation (GA) accidents occur every year and since weather related
accidents are one of the leading causes of death among GA pilots, this leads to a primary
concern for GA safety (Batt & O'Hare, 2005; Knecht, Harris & Shappell, 2005; O'Hare
& Wiegmann, 2001). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) states that of
the 39,199 GA accidents that occurred between 1987 and 2006, a total of 7,611 were
associated with fatalities. As shown in Figure 1, the accidents per year have decreased
overall but the total number of fatal accidents have remained relatively constant (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB]).
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Figure L All General Aviation Accidents that Occurred Between 1987 and 2006.
(From Table 10 at http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Stats.htm)
In Figure 2, the accident and fatality rate was computed per 100,000 flight hours
for the accidents between 1987 and 2006. A downward trend can be observed for the
2

The Influence of Motivation

3

accident rate while the fatality rate has remained relatively constant. These findings are
consistent with the findings in Figure 1 that show over the past two decades the number
of accidents has decreased while the number of fatal accidents have remained unchanged
(NTSB).
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Figure 2. The Accident and Fatality Rates Per 100,000 Hours Between 1987 and 2006.
(From Table 10 at http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Stats.htm)
A GA accident can occur because of many of factors including mechanical failures,
pilot error, lighting (e.g., daytime, nighttime), terrain (e.g., mountain, water) and weather,
just to name a few (Detwiler, Hackworth, Holcomb, Boquet, Pfleiderer, Wiegmann, &
Shappell, 2005). Too complicate matters further, these factors rarely occur in isolation,
but rather in combination with one another.
Weather Related Accidents
While technological advances in the cockpit have made additional information
available to GA pilots, weather-related accidents continue to plague the GA population
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(Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003). Every year, 5 to 9 percent of all GA accidents are weatherrelated (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2005). General aviation has
statistically shown that 3 out of 4 weather-related accidents are associated with fatalities
(O'Hare & Wiegmann, 2001). These statistics are evident in the United States as well as
other countries. Batt and O'Hare (2005) found that weather-related accidents are also a
problem for pilots in Australia. Of the weather-related accidents analyzed from the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 75.6% of the accidents were associated with
fatalities. The high number of weather-related accidents shown by the statistics for the
U.S. and Australia further illustrates the need to understand the underlying factors
associated with weather related accidents. However, it is necessary to first understand
what the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) considers a weather related accident.
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)
Many terms within GA are used to explain different devices, rules, and conditions
while flying. The terms visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC) are used to define the weather conditions that a pilot
encounters while flying. The terms visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules
(IFR) are the rules that govern flying through different weather conditions {Private pilot
manual, 1997). The terms VFR and IFR are used to describe the pilot's flight path while
VMC and IMC describe the conditions in which the pilot is flying in. It is perfectly
acceptable for a pilot to fly an IFR flight plan into VMC weather conditions but it is a
violation of FAA regulations for a pilot to fly with a VFR flight plan into IMC {Private
pilot manual, 1997).

4
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A pilot can fly through VMC or IMC conditions by using VFR or IFR to navigate
through these conditions. VFR or IFR consists of specific Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs) for cloud clearance and visibility requirements. If weather conditions are below
specified VFR minimums, the pilot is required to file an IFR flight plan instead of VFR
flight plan {Private pilot manual, 1997). In order to fly in IFR conditions the pilot must
have the proper instrument certifications and a plane equipped with FAA approved IFR
instrumentation. The ideal flying situation for a pilot is VFR with visibility up to three
miles of visibility and a sky clear of clouds (Nail Report, 1998). A brief discussion of the
established FARs weather minimums will follow as well as how pilots properly access
weather information to make the proper decisions between a VFR and IFR flight plan.
Weather Minimums
There are two kinds of flying airspace, controlled and uncontrolled, which can be
further divided into six flight classes. GA primarily flies in uncontrolled airspace or class
G (AOPA, Air Safety Foundation). Each flight class has different weather minimums for
day and night flights which must be followed for a flight to be considered VFR. For
instances, a basic VFR weather minimums for a class G daytime flight is between 1,200
feet and 10,000 feet including one mile of visibility with 500 feet below cloud clearance,
1,000 feet above cloud clearance, and 2,000 feet horizontal cloud clearance (Federal
Aviation Regulation FAR 91.155). For a pilot to be classified as flying in IMC, the
weather conditions are classified as more degraded or lower than the stated VFR
minimums.
Source of Weather Data. Because flying occurs in a dynamic environment the
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pilot is required to monitor the environment for continuous changes. In aspects of
weather, pilot must pay attention for the indication that weather is degrading to make the
proper decisions to ensure safety of the flight. The pilot has the ability to access weather
information through a number of resources.
Before takeoff, the pilot must obtain a flight plan and a weather report. A computer
generated weather report can be obtained through Direct User Access Terminal Service
(DUATS), or over the phone through Flight Service Station (FSS). DUATS and FSS
allows the pilot access to weather information before planning a flight, filing and closing
the flight plan, and while making changes to the flight plan (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], 1999) While taxing on the runway the pilots can affirm the
weather report through Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). ATIS is a
report constantly verbalized over a particular frequency at an airport to provide pilots
with information that is crucial to the safety of the flight. Some of the information
provided by ATIS is information on active runways, airport call signs used by the pilots
uses to communicate with the controllers, weather information on wind speed and
direction, visibility, ceiling, temperature, dew point, and altimeter settings. Each report is
given a distinct name (e.g., Alpha, Tango, etc.), which indicates to the pilots when a new
report has been generated containing new information. The report is generated about
every 45 minutes and is repeated until a new report is generated (O'Brien, FAA website).
Even with specified weather minimums and a weather reporting system, pilots
often find themselves flying into degrading weather comprising the safety of the flight.
Some reasons why pilots fly into degraded weather exists in the literature and will be
discussed further.
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Factors Associated With Flying Into Degraded Weather
While researchers have tried to explain why pilots fly into weather, the data has
remained equivocal. However, a number of factors have been identified that may
contribute to why pilots fly into degraded weather. A characteristic necessary for safe
flying is a pilots' ability to make the right decision at the appropriate moment. The flight
can become very dangerous if the pilot encounters degrading weather and the pilot must
quickly make the right decision. In some circumstances the consequences that can result
if a pilot makes the wrong decision or makes the right decision to late is death. The
decision making process is important throughout the entire flight and a description of the
decision making process will be discussed as well as aeronautical decision making.
Cognitive Approach to Decision Making
Decisions are made every day dealing with ordinary to very important matters. For
example, a person makes the decision to wear black pants over grey pants whereas that
same person can later make the decision to continue flying into degraded weather or
divert. According to Slade (1994), decision making is a process that encompasses a
series of smaller decisions that occur within a process that can be broken down into eight
discrete actions (see Figure 3). These eight actions include: (1) identifying the problem,
(2) identifying the alternatives, (3) choosing a usual action, (4) evaluating alternatives,
(5) choosing among alternatives, (6) effecting the choice, (7) generating new alternatives,
and (8) abandoning problem (Slade, 1994).
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Figure 3: Slade's (1994) Process of Decision Making
(From Slade, 1994)

Before action can be taken a person must realize that a problem exists. Once a
problem is identified, appropriate alternatives (i.e., solutions) can be determined.
According to Slade's (1994) decision making model usual actions can be identified as
alternatives or effective choices that a person has used in the past that has proven
effective in solving a problem. The established alternatives are evaluated based on the
consequences and advantages as well as against the previous experiences the person had
with the alternative. After evaluation, the alternatives are ranked and the highest ranked
alternative is chosen. If any of the alternatives are ranked equally the alternatives are
further analyzed for the best solution. Once the best alternative is identified, a solution is
then chosen and put into action. In some cases all the alternatives are inadequate for
solving the problem and a list of new alternatives is created. In the end, if no satisfactory
solution is found, the problem is abandoned.
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Slade's (1994) description of the decision making process is a basic overview of
the components involved when making a decision. Similar to Slade's decision making
approach, Jensen's (1995) Judgment model has been used to explain decisions made
within aviation or in the cockpit.
Aeronautical Decision-Making
Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model can be used to explain a pilot's judgment process
when faced with making a decision in aviation. Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model is
comprised of eight stages, which includes: (1) problem vigil, (2) recognition, (3)
diagnosis, (4) alternative identification, (5) risk, (6) background factor, (7) decision, and
(8) action stages (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model
(From Wiegmann & Goh, 2000)
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It is emphasized in the problem vigil stage that the pilot must be alert and aware of
changes in the environment. The pilot obtains information from the environment through
the human senses. For example, a person's vestibular, kinesthetic, tactile, and olfactory
system aid in the identification of changes but the primary senses used in understanding
the environment are the eyes and ears for sight and hearing. When a pilot becomes
distracted they risk missing changes in the environment, allowing a situation to become
dangerous (Jensen, 1995; Wiegmann & Goh, 2000).
In the problem recognition stage, a pilot must recognize the current situation as a
threat to the safety of the flight and the passengers on board. Whether or not a pilot is
successful in identifying the risks is dependent on their perception of the situation and
what they expect may happen. Often times our perceptual system delivers information
through the senses to the brain to be interpreted but is processed incorrectly. The reason
why information is processed incorrectly is because information delivered to the brain is
in simplest form. The purpose of the simplified information is to allow for easier
information processing, which speeds up the recognition of a problem. Because our
perceptual system does not give a complete account of the situation due to
misinterpretations of the information occur when our brain fills in the missing
information. For example, in the corridor illusion the cylinders appear to be different
sizes because our perceptual system places the cylinders in line with the context (see
Figure 5). Our senses take the simplest message and our brain interprets the cylinders as
different because perceiving the cylinders as the same requires more information
processing and energy. Just like a perceptual error is made in the perception of the size
of the cylinders, pilots make perceptual errors in aviation. A pilot may not perceive
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weather as dangerous and make a judgment error when deciding to fly VFR into
degraded weather conditions (Jensen, 1995).

Figure 5: The Corridor Illusion
(From Jensen, 1995)
In addition to perception, a pilot uses past experiences or expectancy to judge the
likelihood of certain outcomes. Expectancy can be defined as the "thought patterns
which tend to bias our interpretations of our environment" (Jensen, 1995, p. 41). A pilot
reduces the level of information that needs processing by using past experiences to
predict what will occur in current or future situations. As explained earlier, the
perceptual system can lead to judgment errors, and aviation training that focuses on using
knowledge, experience, and maintaining an alert state can counteract these types of
perceptual judgment errors (Jensen, 1995).
In the diagnosis stage, the pilot must gain an understanding of the nature of the
problem before solutions can be created to fix the problem. When a problem is
identified, the pilot must understand the current situation and how any change to the
environment can influence the current state and the circumstances in the future. If a pilot
makes an incorrect diagnosis the situation could become unsafe or even fatal, and
unfortunately, pilots are required to diagnosis a situation very quickly (Jensen, 1995). To
make quick decisions, a pilot can use understanding of past experiences with similar
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situations and knowledge of hazards to make correct diagnoses (Wiegmann & Goh,
2000).
In the alternative identification stage, the pilot identifies multiple courses of action
that can be used to resolve the problem. The pilot must choose an alternative that will
keep the aircraft and passengers safe by using a combination of creativity, knowledge of
the aircraft, knowledge of the environment, and knowledge of the aviation system as a
whole. In the risk stage, the pilot is required to associate the risks with each alternative
based on a number of factors like the skill level of the pilot, reliability of the weather
forecast, and the reliability of the aircraft. The background factor stage affects the
judgment process by representing the influencing motivational factors that prevent a
person from making purely rational decisions. Factors like duty, economics, adventure,
commitment, ego, social pressures from peers, superiors, passengers, co-workers, and
physiological pressures from illness and fatigue influence every cognitive decision the
pilot makes (Jensen, 1995).
In the decision stage, the pilot chooses a specific course of action and prepares to
implement the decision. At this time, the pilot is about to make a decision that could
result in negative consequences. In the final stage, the action stage, the pilot takes all the
information about the situation, concerning the problem and appropriate solution, and
puts the solution into "action" (i.e., physically and mentally) to solve the problem. As
shown in Figure 4, a feedback loop is present in Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model. Since
the aviation environment is dynamic, the feedback loop in Jensen's (1995) Judgment
Model represents the iterative nature of decision making. Each stage is completed for
one problem at a time, and after the solution has been implemented, the entire process is
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repeated whenever a new problem arises. A pilot does not make a decision based on the
serial order of accomplishing these stages. Each stage is not independent of each other
and can influence one another while making a decision. Jensen's (1995) judgment model
is shown as a linear model for instructional purposes to understand the decision making
process.
Aeronautical Decision-Making While Flying Through Degraded Weather. A
pilot must make a series of decisions when flying through weather, and the dynamic
nature of flying requires pilots always pay attention. Many times pilots receive cues that
weather is changing but continue to fly VFR into degraded weather (Burian, Orasanu, &
Hitt, 2000). When pilots receive cues that weather is deteriorating and continue into
degraded weather, it is said that a plan continuation event (PCE) has occurred. Burian,
Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) investigated whether pilot's experience level (e.g., flight hours)
and degradation of weather affected the number of PCEs committed. The results
revealed that experience level played a role in the occurrences of PCEs. The pilots in the
th

lower 25 percentile for flight experience hours were more likely to commit a PCE than
th

the pilots in the upper 75 percentile for flight experience. It was also found that more
PCEs are committed when flying into gradually degrading weather than weather that
degrades quickly. The changes in gradually degrading weather are harder to perceive and
can lead some pilots to misperceive weather conditions. Both experience level and
perception of weather conditions may play a role in whether pilots fly into weather.
Some factors according to Wiegmann and Goh (2000) will be discussed to explain why
some pilots fly into degraded weather.
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Wiegmann and Goh (2000) added four factors alongside Jensen's Judgment Model
to help explain why some pilots fly into degraded weather. These factors include (1)
situation assessment, (2) risk perception, (3) motivation, and (4) decision framing (Figure
6). The concepts of situation assessment, risk perception, motivation, and decision
framing have been associated with the decision making steps of Jensen's (1995)
Judgment Model to conceptualize how these four factors play a role in pilot's decision
making abilities when flying into degraded weather.
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Figure 6: Four Factors From Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model
(From Wiegmann & Goh, 2000)

When considering situation assessment skills, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) state that
according to the situation assessment hypothesis, some pilots fly VFR into IMC because
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they incorrectly assessed the hazards associated with the situation (Goh & Wiegmann,
2002a; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). Reasons why a
pilot assesses a situation incorrectly can include inexperience and poor hazard awareness.
Inexperienced pilots lack the ability that experienced pilots have to quickly and
efficiently identify weather hazards. A pilot who has more experience with degrading
weather will identify weather changes faster than a pilot who has little or no experience.
It is harder for a pilot to discriminate gradual weather changes, from minimum VFR
conditions to marginal VFR and finally to IFR than in a situation where drastic weather
changes occur. When weather degrades gradually, the pilot does not notices the changes
and may fly into degrading weather without realizing that he or she has done so until it is
too late. A pilot may also have poor hazard awareness and simply underestimate the
hazards associated with situation. For example, a pilot with poor hazard awareness will
consider weather as an unlikely cause of an accident and, as a result, fly into weather
(Wiegmann & Goh, 2000).
In addition to situation assessment, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that risk
perception or poor risk perception can contribute to why some pilots fly into weather.
Risk can be defined "as the likelihood of suffering a loss due to a hazard" (Wiegmann
and Goh, 2000, p. 3), A pilot may assess degrading weather accurately but underestimate
the risk (e.g., crashing and/or death) associated with the situation. One reason why pilots
underestimated risks is because a pilot may be overconfident in their abilities to control
the aircraft. Pilots are trained to be confident in their skills and abilities and a by-product
of this training, pilots may become overconfident and suffer what is known as confidence
calibration.
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Knecht, Harris, & Shappell (2005) describe confidence calibration as the degree to
which a pilot's confidence level in accomplishing a task truly matches their ability to
accomplish a task. The zero risk theory can be applied to aviation to explain the
relationship between a pilot's confidence level and risk perception in a situation. The
zero risk theory states that, "the perceived risk in a situation is the product of the
perceived likelihood of a hazardous event and the importance attached by the individual
to the consequence of the event" (Hunter, 2002, p. 1). What this means is that as a pilot's
confidence level increases the perceived level of risk for a situation diminishes. A pilot
gains experience through training in a situation the perceived level of risk for that
situation diminishes (Hunter, 2002).
Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that motivational factors (e.g., personal, social, or
financial factors) can lead some pilots to fly into degraded weather. For example, a pilot
experiences personal pressure to continue into degraded weather when the pilot wants to
reach the destination (i.e., "get-home-itis") to spend time with a love one or family
member. Social pressures to continue flying into degraded weather can come from the
pilots' organization (e.g., time pressure, etc.) or from the passengers in the aircraft. In
respect to financial incentive, pilots are only paid when "in-flight" and the decision to
stay grounded or divert to an alternative airport is unappealing to the pilots and to the
passengers. These pressures bias the pilot's decisions regardless of whether the
assessment of the situation suggests otherwise.
Last, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that based on how the pilots view the
framing of the alternatives (e.g., positive or negative) can lead some pilots to fly into
degraded weather. Whether a pilot makes a decision between a risky or safe choice is
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dependent on the decision framing of the alternatives. For example, when a pilot is faced
with degrading weather and must make the decision to divert or continue whether the
pilot views this decision as a loss or gain will affect his or her decision to divert or
continue. If a pilot views the decision to divert as a loss of investment (e.g., time, money
or effort), the pilot will take a risk-seeking outlook and make a risky decision to fly into
degraded weather. On the other hand, if a pilot views diverting the flight as a gain (e.g.,
increasing flight safety), a risk-averse outlook will be taken and the pilot will make the
decision to divert to a safe alternative (O'Hare & Smitheram, 1995; Wiegmann & Goh,
2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2001). As shown by the Prospect Theory Value
Function (see Figure 7), the gain curve is much steeper than the loss curve because
people have extreme responses to a choice involving a loss. If a pilot is confronted with a
decision that could result in a negative outcome (e.g., loss of resources, diverting) the
pilot may chose another decision to maintain that investment (i.e., continuing into
degraded weather).

VALUE

LOSSES

GAINS

Figure 7: The Prospect Theory Hypothetical Value Function
(From Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)
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A pilot views a decision as a loss or gain in reference to their current position rather
than the final outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Because of this, a pilot will view
the decision frame as a gain or a loss based on the proximity of accomplishing the goals
of the flight. One of the pilot's goals is to arrive at the destination, and the closer the
pilot is to accomplishing that goal, the higher the chance the pilot will continue into
degrading weather. The pilot's decision to continue into degraded weather to arrive at
the destination can be influenced by the sunk cost effect or what is known as "get-homeit-is" (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001a; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare,
2002). The sunk cost effect is an irrational economic behavior that causes a person to
continue participating in a task, even if continuing that task puts that person at risk (Arkes
& Blumer, 1985). Once a pilot has invested resources in the flight (e.g., time and money)
the decision to continue into degraded weather will be more likely, sometimes regardless
of life-threatening factors.
Jensen's (1995) Judgment model is one model that describes the steps involved
while making a decision. When trying to understand the process involved in aeronautical
decision making, situation assessment, risk perception, motivation, and decision framing
must be considered and understood. These four factors were incorporated into Jensen's
(1995) Judgment Model and are located alongside the appropriate steps (see Figure 7).
Situation assessment is paired with the recognition and diagnosis stages and aids with a
pilot's ability to recognize the problem and identify a diagnosis for that problem. Risk
perception is paired with the risk stage because a pilot must identify the risks associated
with a problem before the risks can be understood. The background factor influences a
person's ability to make irrational decisions and many times motivation is a key
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component that influences our decision-making. Depending on the type of motivation
(e.g., personal or social pressures), these pressures influence whether we will make a
good or bad decision. Finally, decision framing is paired with the decision step because
the way in which the pilot views the alternatives, influences what decision will be made.
In other words, the way in which the decision is framed (e.g., gain or loss) determines
what the pilot will choose. Once a decision is chosen and put into action, the outcome
from this decision may be very different than an outcome from another decision. This is
why it is important especially in aviation that the right decision is made at the appropriate
time. These four factors have an integral role in aiding or inhibiting a pilot's ability to
make safe weather-related decisions and must be considered when analyzing the reasons
why pilots fly into degraded weather.
Focus of the Study
Rationale
Both motivation and the sunk-cost effect were investigated in this study and three
hypotheses existed for the results. Because money is a strong motivating factor, half of
the pilots were financially motivated by a bonus payment for reaching the destination.
The remaining group of pilots did not receive a bonus payment and were not financially
motivated to reach the destination. The pilots that received the financial motivator were
labeled as being extrinsically motivated (EM) while the pilots that did not receive the
bonus payment were labeled as being intrinsically motivated (IM). The purpose behind
this design was to create a scenario that would encourage the EM pilots to continue
longer into degraded, while the IM pilots would be more inclined to divert when they
encountered degrading weather.
19
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According to the prospect theory, if a decision is framed as a loss (e.g., time,
money, effort, etc.) the probability of a pilot continuing the flight into degraded weather
increases. According to the sunk cost effect, pilots will continue into degraded weather
after an investment (i.e., money, time) has been made. The pilots that encounter weather
closer to the destination or late in the flight will continue into weather longer than pilots
who encounter weather farther away from the destination or early in the flight. The pilots
who encounter degraded weather late in the flight have invested more in the flight and
will have a stronger desire to reach the destination than the pilots who encounter weather
early in the flight who have invested less (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a).
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis One. It was hypothesized that a significant main effect for motivation
would be found. It was expected that the EM pilots would fly longer into degraded
weather than the IM pilots.
Hypothesis Two. It was also expected that a significant main effect for investment
would be found. The pilots who encounter degraded weather late in the flight (WL)
would fly longer into degraded weather than the pilots who encounter degraded weather
early in the flight (WE).
Hypothesis Three. Last, it was hypothesized that the significant main effects would
be modified by an interaction between investment and motivation. A significant
difference would be found between the EM pilots and the IM pilots who encountered
weather early in the flight. Overall, it was expected that the EM pilots who encountered
weather late in the flight would continue the longest into degraded weather while the IM
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pilots who encountered weather early in the flight would continue into degraded weather
the least amount of time.
In this study, a group of pilots encountered degraded weather early in the flight
while the remaining group of pilots encountered weather late in the flight. According to
the sunk cost effect, the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight would continue
longer into degrading weather than the pilots who encountered degrading weather early in
the flight. The pilots who encounter degrading weather late in the flight have invested
more resources (e.g., time, money, and resources) in the flight and are closer to the final
destination these pilots will continue longer into weather than the pilots who encounter
degraded weather early in the flight or invested less in the flight.
Statement of Problem and Research Question
The reason for conducting this research was to better understand why pilots fly into
degraded weather. Narrowing our focus, the research question that existed for this study
was whether pilots would continue to fly into degraded weather longer after investment
and motivational factors have been implemented.
Method
Participants
The sample population consisted of 40 instrument rated pilots from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. Rather than using VFR pilots, instrument rated pilots were used
as the sample in the study because it was assumed that instrument rated pilots had the
experience level to recognize degraded weather.
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Participant Demographic Information. After signing the informed consent form
(Appendix A), the pilots completed the demographics data flight performance
questionnaire (Appendix B) on background flight information. The following
demographic information was gathered: (1) age, (2) number of hours flown in VFR, (3)
number of hours flown in IFR, and (4) number of hours flown in technically advanced
aircraft (TAA) (see Table 1). The pilot's VFR, IFR, and TAA hours were focused on
rather than certifications since the pilot's flight hours is more indicative of their
experience level than just certification level. For example, a pilot with a commercial
aircraft certification was viewed as having a higher certification when compared to a pilot
with a private pilot's license. Having the commercial certification does not necessarily
equate to more experience than having a private pilot's license. The private pilot may
have more flight hours than the commercial pilot but is viewed as less experienced when
certification is considered alone when determining experience level. The data shows
some variability because of a few outliers that existed in the flight hours reported by the
pilots.
Table 1. Table of Means for Age, VFR, IFR, TAA Hours (standard deviations)
Conditions

Age

VFR Hrs

IFR Hrs

TAA Hrs

Early Weather (12mins)
Externally Motivated
Early Weather (12mins)
Internally Motivated

22.1(3.14)

243.5(145.2)

34.8 (29.57)

57.9 (44.09)

20.2(1.23)

207(90.31)

43 (59.26)

38(22.01)

Late Weather (30 mins)
Externally Motivated

21.2(0.78)

303 (339.39)

51.9(29.82)

29.8 (24.39)

Late Weather (30 mins)
Internally Motivated

21.9(1.85)

387.5 (439.06)

37.8 (30.75)

85.9(58.38)

21.35(2.03)

285.25 (287.39)

41.86(38.46)

52.9(44.31)

Total
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Design
The experimental design was a 2 (investment, weather early and weather late) x 2
(motivation, EM and IM) between subjects design, with the dependent measure being the
length of time the pilots continued into degraded weather. The pilots were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions that varied in terms of investment and motivation.
Investment. Half of the pilots encountered degrading weather after completing
about 25 percent of the flight, or weather early in the flight, while the remaining half of
the pilots received degraded weather after completing about 75 percent of the flight, or
weather late in the flight. Since it was estimated that the flight would last for 42 minutes
the pilots who encountered weather early in the flight experienced degrading weather 12
minutes into the 42 minute session, while the pilots who encountered degraded weather
late in flight experienced degrading weather 30 minutes into the 42 minute session. A
description of the scenario used for the pilots who encountered degraded weather late is
located in Appendix D, while the scenario for the pilots who encountered degraded
weather is located in Appendix E.
Motivation. The flight was designed as a life flight. The pilots were told they
would be delivering a liver from Daytona Beach to Gainesville. The purpose of making
the life flight was to motivate all the pilots to arrive at the destination. All of the pilots
were paid 25 dollars for participating in the study. To see if an additional financial
payment would motivate the pilots to fly longer into weather, half of the pilots were
randomly assigned to an extrinsic motivation, EM, condition, which these pilots received
an additional 20 dollars if they arrived at Gainesville. If the pilot decided to divert to an
alternative airport during the flight and did not arrive at the Gainesville, they received 25
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dollars for participating but did not receive the additional 20 dollar bonus payment. As a
way to manipulate financial motivation, the remaining group of pilots did not receive a
bonus payment for reaching Gainesville and were labeled as the intrinsic motivated, IM,
condition. Regardless of whether the IM pilots landed in Gainesville or diverted, the
pilots received 25 dollars for participating in the study.
Time into Degraded Weather. The length of time each pilot flew into weather was
measured until their diversion time or their landing time at Gainesville. For example, if a
WE pilot decided to divert at the point where weather began to degrade, the length of
time the pilot flew into weather until the pilot diverted was documented. Once it was
indicated that the pilots diverted from the flight plan to an alternative path, the pilots were
allowed to continue flying to an alternative airport to land. If the pilot decided to
continue to Gainesville, the length of time the pilots flew into degraded weather from the
point at which weather began to degrade to landing at Gainesville was documented.
Before the analyses were conducted the length of time the pilots flew into degraded
was restricted to 15 minutes. If the pilots continued after 15 minutes, their time into
weather was indicated at 15 minutes and marked as continuing to the destination. The
reason the 15 minute cutoff time was used in all the flight conditions was to hold the
length of time the pilots could continue into weather consistent between the pilots who
encountered weather early in the flight (WE) pilots and those pilots who encountered
weather late in the flight (WL) pilots. This way the WE pilots did not have more time to
fly into degraded weather than the WL pilots who had about 15 minutes of flying time
after degraded weather was encountered.
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Apparatus and Materials
Simulator. The experiment was conducted in the Technologically Advanced
Aircraft Performance (TAAP) Laboratory, using an Elite flight simulator (Figure 8). The
ELITE flight simulator is a technically advanced aircraft equipped with a GARMIN
interface. The GARMIN interface has a multiple functional display (MFD), traffic
information service (TIS), and moving map, which was programmed by the investigator.
The pilots were not allowed to manipulate any information on the moving display and no
traffic information was presented. Microsoft Flight Simulator 2004 was the software
used to operate the Elite flight simulator as the pilots flew the Cessna 172. The flight
scenario was projected using a liquid crystal display (LCD) projector onto an eight foot
screen located in front of the simulator. A stop watch was used to track the length of
time the flight scenario lasted and the length of time the pilots flew into degraded
weather.

Figure 8: Photograph of the Elite system Cessna 172 simulation device.
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Pre-Experimental Questionnaire. The pilots completed two questionnaires before
starting the flight scenario. These questionnaires included the informed consent and the
demographic questionnaire.
Post-Experimental Questionnaire. After the flight scenario, the pilots completed
the post-experimental questionnaire, the Federal Aeronautical Decision Making /
Judgment Questionnaire (FADM/JQ). The FADM/JQ was modified by Blickensderfer
and Summers from the Federal Aviation Administration Pilot Survey created by Driskill,
Weissmuller, Quebec, Hand, and Hunter (1998). The questionnaire revised by
Blickersderfer and Summers was reviewed for weather related scenarios and used to
comprised the FADM/JQ (see Appendix C). This questionnaire assessed the pilots'
decision making process through scripted weather related scenarios. The pilots were
asked to read the questions and rank the likelihood they would perform each action on a 5
point Likert Scale, which ranged from 1 meaning a highly unlikely option or unlikely
course of action and 5 indicating a highly likely option or likely course of action.
Degradation of Weather for Every Condition
The entire flight scenario was created by a subject matter expert, which included
the weather manipulations. All the flight scenarios started with the same VFR weather
condition indicated as the initial weather setting presented in Table 2. These conditions
were specified in the weather manipulation settings of Microsoft Flight Simulator. In an
effort to make weather seem as though it was degraded gradually, the first change
occurred early (12 minutes) or late (30 minutes) into the flight and the next two changes
occurred after one minute intervals had passed. The changes from initial weather settings
to the first degradation included a change from 10 miles of visibility to 5 miles of
26
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visibility and a change from a cloud base of 8,000 scattered to 5,000 broken (i.e., from
4/8 scattered to 5/8 broken in Microsoft Flight Simulator Settings). After one minute or
at 13 or 31 minutes had passed, the second change from 4/8 broken to 5/8 broken
occurred. At 14 or 32 minutes into the flight the third change from 5/8 broken to 7/8
broken with a visibility of 3 miles was implemented. In total, weather degraded three
times with one minute intervals occurring between each change. The one minute
intervals were done to mimic gradually changing weather that often occurs in a real world
flying situations.
Table 2: Table of the Initial Weather Specifications and Changes
Weather Specifications

Initial Weather
(Start of Flight)

First Change
(12 or 30 mins)

Second Change
(13 or 31 mins)

Third Change
(14 or 32 mins)

Ceiling: 15,000/base

/8,000 scattered

/5,000 broken

/5,000 broken

/5,000 broken

Scattered 4/8

Broken 5/8

Broken 6/8

Broken 7/8

Visibility

10 miles

5 miles

5 miles

3 miles

Temperature (dew point)

23(15)

23(15)

23(15)

23(15)

Wind:
altitude, direction, speed

6000,290, 13

6000,290,13

6000,290, 13

6000,290,13

Microsoft Ceiling Setting

Regardless of condition, the scenarios called for two more weather degradations
before reaching Gainesville. The second to last occurred as the pilot was passing over
Palatka and the last was 10 miles from the Gainesville airport. The weather over Palatka
was degraded from the third change by setting rain to moderate and increasing visibility
to 5 miles and ceiling to 7000 overcast (see Table 3). Some of the WL pilots flew over
Palatka before the initial weather changes allotted to occur at 30 minutes. These pilots
did not receive the changes indicated to occur over Palatka and received the initial
changes after 30 minutes has passed. If these WL pilots continued to Gainesville after
receiving the weather at 30 minutes, they received the weather changes 10 miles from
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Gainesville with moderate levels of rain being implemented here. All of the pilots that
received the initial three weather changes received the weather changes over Palatka.
Other than the changes made to some of the WL pilots, all other weather changes were
consistent across conditions. Weather rarely changes immediately and stays constant for
period of time. In effort to create realistic weather conditions, the weather in the
experiment gradually degraded and changed a total of five times over the entire flight.
Table 3: Table of the Last Two Weather Changes
Weather Specifications

Third Change
(14 or 32 mins)

Crossing Palatka

10 Miles from GN

Ceiling: 15,000/base

/5,000 broken

/7000 overcast

/1500 scattered

Microsoft Ceiling Setting

Broken 7/8

Scattered 5/8

3 miles

Overcast
5 miles

None

Moderate

Moderate

Temperature (dew point)

23(15)

23(15)

23(15)

Wind:
altitude, direction, speed

6000,290, 13

6000,290, 13

6000,290, 13

Visibility
Rain

3 miles

Procedure
In the first thirty minutes of the experiment, the pilots read and signed the informed
consent and filled out the demographic questionnaire. The pilots were assured that their
information would be kept confidential and should answer the questionnaires as honestly
and accurately as possible. It was also explained that the pilots should not speak with
anyone about any information they learned during the session with anyone else. This
helped to ensure that other instrument rated pilots could participate without fear of
gaining additional information that could affect their performance in the study.
The pilots received a briefing form prior to the flight. The briefing form included
information about how to operate the simulator. The pilots were informed that the flight
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was a "life flight" and that they would be transporting a liver from Daytona Beach to a
patient in Gainesville. The reason behind this design was to create a realistic need for the
pilots to reach the destination. The pilots were then told that their flight was a VFR flight
from Daytona Beach Airport to the Gainesville Airport about 42 minutes away. The
requested altitude was indicated at 4500 feet and that their call sign to be used throughout
the entire flight was "Riddle Life Flight 321". The pilots were informed that the military
restrictive areas located between Daytona Beach and Gainesville were active and should
be avoided. If the pilot was assigned to the extrinsically motivated condition, they
received the information about the bonus payment when reaching the Gainesville airport.
The pilots were then instructed that they could spend a few minutes looking over
the information and when ready were instructed to get into the simulator. Once in the
simulator the pilot was given the sectional and was informed where navigational buttons
were located. Some of these buttons included the CDI, OBS, heading bug, VOR
navigations, electric trim, and flap switch. The pilot was instructed to put on the headset
located in the simulator to communicate with the air traffic controller (ATC) seated
directly behind the simulator. The pilots were given as much time as needed to
familiarize themselves with the cockpit before starting the flight scenario. Once the pilot
put on the headset and programmed the radio stack, ATIS was read by ATC as well as
clearance, delivery and tower. Upon completion of these steps the pilot was cleared for
takeoff.
Once the pilot initiated takeoff, the stop watch was started to record the time during
the flight. The timer was used to record the entire flight time, time to encounter
degrading weather (i.e., early/12 minutes or late/30 minutes), one minute intervals at
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which weather was degraded, and the length of time the pilots penetrated weather (i.e.,
dependent measure). Based on random assignment, the pilots received degrading
weather early or late into the flight. Weather was degraded three times with one minute
intervals between each change. Two additional weather changes occurred, one over
Palatka and the last weather change 10 miles from Gainesville. The pilots received these
changes unless they flew a different flight that did not cross Palatka, flew over Palatka
before the initial weather changes occurred, or diverted before these changes could be
implemented.
Ten minutes into every flight a "radio failure" occurred. The failure allowed the
pilots to hear ATC's calls but made it seem as though ATC could not hear the pilot's
calls. The reason behind the radio failure was to prevent the pilots from calling ATC to
file an IFR flight plan when degraded weather was encountered. This forced the pilots to
make the decision to continue the flight and deliver the liver or divert the flight to a safe
location.
The experiment could end in one of following three ways: the pilot could continue
flying VFR into degraded weather which eventually turned into IMC reaching the
destination, the pilot could crash before reaching the destination, or the pilot could divert
from the flight plan and land at an alternative airport. All of the pilots successfully
landed the aircraft regardless of whether they continued the flight to the destination or
diverted. If the pilot decided to divert from the flight plan, the rater indicated this
decision and marked the time at which this action occurred. Once the pilots landed, they
were asked to exit the simulator and were instructed to complete the post-experimental
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questionnaire. After the pilots completed the questionnaires they were told the reason
why the study was conducted, received their payment and thanked for their participation.
Results
Exploratory Analysis
The data from the 40 pilots was entered and analyzed using Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 14.0. The condition to which the pilots were
randomly assigned and the length of time each pilot flew into weather was entered into
SPSS. The dependent variable was calculated by subtracting the point at which the
pilots encountered degraded weather (12 or 30 minutes) from the pilot's diversion time,
landing time at the destination in Gainesville, or if the pilots continued past 15 minutes a
cutoff point of 15 minutes was implemented to maintain a consistent amount of time the
pilots were allowed to fly into weather across the conditions. An exploratory data
analysis was conducted on the data to adequately display how motivation and investment
influenced the length of time the pilots flew into weather.
As shown in Table 4, the externally motivated (EM) pilots who encountered
weather early in the flight flew an average of 12.79 minutes, {SD = 4.72), into degraded
weather while the EM pilots who encountered degraded weather late in the flight flew
6.96 minutes (SD = 5.41). The internally motivated (IM) pilots who encountered
degraded weather early in the flight continued into weather for 7.55 minutes, {SD = 5.92)
and the IM pilots who encountered degraded weather late in the flight continued into
weather 8.56 minutes, {SD = 5.62). Based on visual inspection of the means, the EM
pilots who encountered degraded weather early in the flight continued the longest, while
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the EM pilots who encountered weather late in the flight continued the shortest amount of
time. The two remaining groups continued into weather somewhere in between.

Table 4. Table of the Time into Weather Raw Means (standard deviations)
Investment: Encountered Degraded Weather
Early (12 minutes)

Late (30 Minutes)

Motivation
Extrinsic (EM)

12.79(4.72)

6.96(5.41)

Intrinsic (IM)

7.55 (5.92)

8.56 (5.62)

Levine 's Homogeneity of Variance. Because homogeneity of variance is one of the
assumptions of ANOVA and indeed, most parametric tests, Levine's test was used to
assess departure from this assumption. The results, F{3, 36) = 3.496, p=.025, indicated
that the group variances were not sufficiently homogeneous, however the robustness of
the ANOVA with respect to the violation of this assumption allows for meaningful
results (Howell, 2002).
MANOVA
In order to assess the degree to which experience (i.e., flight hours) related to the
independent variables a two-way multivariate analysis of variance was conducted on
TAA, VFR, and IFR flight hours. The MANOVA for the three categories of flight hours
revealed a significant interaction for weather and motivation, X (3, 34) = 3.82; p = 0.018.
The univariate tests found that the interaction resulted from the relationship between
weather and motivation for TAA only, F(l, 36) = 8.98;/? = 0.005. Since the main focus
of this investigation was not flight hours, no simple effects were employed to decompose
the interaction, however, TAA was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses to ensure
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that any systematic effects of TAA on the dependent measure was held constant across
the treatment groups.
Individual correlations between VFR, IFR, and TAA hours and the length of time
the pilots flew into weather were conducted. No significant differences were found for
the correlations of VFR hours, r(38) = -0.222,/? = 0.17, IFR hours, r(38) = -0.154,/? =
0.342, and TAA hours, r(38) = -0.268,/? = 0.095. When these three negative scores are
compared, TAA hours resulted in the largest negative score. Even though differences
were not significant, the negative correlations indicate that the pilots with fewer flight
hours (i.e., experience) continued into weather longer than the pilots that had more hours.
ANCOVA
In order to assess group differences in terms of continued flight into degrading
weather, a 2 (internal/external motivation) X 2 (early/late weather) analysis of co variance
(ANCOVA) with TAA hours serving as the covariate was conducted. The significant
result for TAA hours, F (1, 35) = 6.395,/? =0.016, indicated systematic variation of this
factor across the groups supporting the use as a covariate. The ANCOVA revealed a
non-significant main effect for weather, F(l, 35) = 1.357,/? = .252, and a non-significant
main effect for motivation, F{\, 35) = 6.908,/? = .607. The non-significant results
indicate that no differences existed with respect to weather and motivation.
The non-significant main effects for weather and motivation were modified by a
significant interaction between weather and motivation, F{\, 31) = 9.223,/? = .004 (see
Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Mean comparisons between conditions

Simple Effects. To verify the mean differences noted in Figure 9, simple effects
analyses were conducted to decompose the interaction. The simple effect analyses
assessed motivation (extrinsic/intrinsic) at each level of weather (early/late). The
analyses revealed that the interaction resulted from the significantly longer persistence of
the EM pilots when compared against the IM pilots while encountering weather early in
the flight, F{\, 35) = 7.46,/? = .01. No significant difference was found when the EM
pilots were compared against the IM pilots when encountering weather late in the flight,
F{\, 35) = 3.22, /? = .081. This implies that the manipulation of motivation and
investment for the pilots who encountered weather late in flight did not have an effect on
the length of time the pilots flew into weather. On the other hand, the manipulation of
motivation and investment for the pilots who encountered weather early in the flight did
have an effect on the length of time the pilots flew into weather.
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Kruskal-Wallis
The 19 questions from the FADM/JQ were assessed to isolate specific questions
that dealt with in-flight weather-related decision making scenarios. A Kruskal-Wallis
analysis was used to analyze the ranking scores on questions 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and
18. Specifically, the analyses were conducted to identify if a majority of the pilots who
continued or diverted ranked any of the options similarly. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis
revealed significant differences only on the likelihood rankings for 7b, H{\) = 12.037,/? =
.001, and 18c, H{\) = 4.364,/? = .037. The significant findings indicated that differences
existed in the responses of the pilots that continued and the responses of the pilots that
diverted in the experimental session. A frequency count was done to identify how the 40
pilots ranked options 7b and 18c.
For question 7, a situation was described in which the first half of a four hour flight
was slightly better than marginal VFR. The pilot departs and reaches a level altitude in
VFR conditions and is ready to call in to check with Flight Watch. The pilot expects that
while calling Flight Watch they will be asked for their PIREP. Option 7b states that the
pilot informs Flight Watch they are to busy and can't take the time to report their PIREP.
The significant difference indicates that differences exist on how pilots who continued
and the pilots that diverted ranked this option as a likely course of action.
A frequency distribution, (see Figure 10), revealed that a majority of the pilots who
diverted ranked 7b as a one and two (i.e., an unlikely choice) while a majority of the
pilots that continued ranked 7b as a two (i.e., an unlikely course of action). It should be
noted that very few pilots ranked this option as a five or a likely course of action. These
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frequency counts indicate that a large number of pilots who diverted did not take the time
too report their PIREP, while the pilots that continued responded in a similar manner.
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Figure 10. Frequency counts between the pilots that diverted and continued on the
likelihood rankings for 7b

Question 18 describes a situation where a pilot receives information from ATIS
that the weather is below minimums at the destination. The pilot receives holding
instructions while expect further clearance (EFC ) is one hour away. The pilot only has
an hour and 15 minutes of fuel and the passenger urges the pilot to hold because of a
meeting that can not be missed. Option 18c states that the pilot enters the hold and hopes
that ATC can fit them in sooner than the EFC time.
The frequency distribution (see Figure 11) for the pilot's rankings revealed that a
majority of the pilots who diverted ranked 18c as a two (i.e., an unlikely course of action)
or three (i.e., mutually exclusive course of action) with very few pilots ranking this
option as a five (i.e., a likely course of action). The pilots that continued ranked 18c as a
three (i.e., a mutually exclusive course of action) with five (i.e., a likely course of action)
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being the next biggest ranking group. This means that a majority of pilots who diverted
found the option to hold as an unlikely course of action while the pilots who continued
ranked the option to enter the hold more appealing.
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Figure 11. The frequency counts between the pilots that diverted and continued on the
likelihood rankings for 18c
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis One. It was hypothesized that a significant main effect for motivation
would be found. It was also expected that the pilots who received the financial incentive
would fly longer into adverse weather than the pilots in the non-incentive group. This
hypothesis was not supported since no significant differences were found in the length of
time the pilots flew into weather due to the manipulation of motivation.
Hypothesis Two. It was expected that a significant main effect for investment
would be found. It was also expected that the pilots who encountered degraded weather
late (30 minutes) into the flight would fly longer into degraded weather than the pilots
who encountered weather early (12 minutes) into the flight. The non-significant main
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effect found for investment did not support this hypothesis and the manipulation of
investment did not have an effect.
Hypothesis Three. It was hypothesized that the main effects would be modified by
an interaction between investment and motivation. It was expected that a significant
difference would be found between the EM and IM pilots who encountered weather early
in the flight, while no significant differences were found between the EM pilots and IM
pilots who encountered degrading weather late in the flight. It was expected that the EM
pilots who encountered weather late would continue the longest while the IM pilots who
encountered weather early would continue the shortest amount of time into weather.
This hypothesis was partially supported when the non-significant main effects for
investment and motivation were modified by the significant interaction between
motivation and investment but the subsequent analyses did not support the remaining
hypothesis. Based on the simple effects analysis, the significant results for the EM and
IM pilots who encountered weather early and the non-significant findings for the EM and
IM pilots who encountered weather late support this hypothesis but the overall findings
do not support this hypothesis. The EM pilots that encountered weather early continued
into weather the longest while the EM pilot who encountered weather late continued the
shortest amount of time into weather. These findings are contrary to what was expected
and some reasons exist to why this may be.
Discussion
Many models exist that can be used to explain the decision making process. Two
examples discussed in this paper are Slade's (1994) basic overview of decision making
and Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model, which has helped researchers understand the
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mechanisms involved in the decision making process. Decisions are made everyday and
can range from easy ones like what color pants to wear, to difficult decisions like whether
to continue or divert when encountering degraded weather. Some of the factors that
influence the decision making abilities of pilots' include situation assessment, risk
perception, motivation, and decision framing. This study focused on motivation and the
sunk-cost effect, as a means of understanding why some pilots fly into degraded weather.
The sunk-cost effect claims that pilots who have invested more resources (e.g.,
time, effort, money) will be more likely to continue flying into degraded weather than
pilots who have invested fewer resources. Once a pilot has made an investment in a
flight, the potential for losing this investment will increase the likelihood of continuing
the flight into degraded weather, even if the situation is unsafe (Kahneman & Tversky,
1984). For example, accident LAX04FA113, presented at the beginning of this paper,
supports the sunk-cost effect since the pilot continued the flight through degraded
weather resulting in an accident associated with fatalities close to the destination. This
accident example along with accident statistics reveal that many GA pilots fly into
weather every year and, unfortunately, 75% of weather-related accidents are associated
with fatalities (O'Hare & Wiegmann, 2001). It was because of the unforgiving nature of
weather-related accidents that this study investigated the role that the sunk-cost effect
(i.e., investment) and motivation play in pilots' decision making abilities when
encountering degraded weather. The results from this study do not support the sunk-cost
effect and some reasons to explain these results include flight experience, the situation
assessment hypothesis, differences in perceptual processing, and cognitive anchoring.
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One explanation for why some pilots fly into weather is due to differences that
exist in flight experience (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002b). Experience levels or flight hours
were investigated to see if a relationship existed between motivation, investment, and the
length of time the pilots flew into degraded weather. Specifically, VFR, IFR, and TAA
hours, were investigated and the significant difference found for TAA hours indicated a
relationship between experience levels in TAA and the likelihood of continuing into
degraded weather conditions. The individual correlations between VFR, IFR, and TAA
while not significant, did reveal a negative linear relationship for all three variables
relative to flight experience. Similar to what Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) found,
the negative correlations indicate that the pilots who had more flight hours flew less time
into weather while the pilots who had fewer flight hours flew longer into weather. This
leads to the assumption that flight experience plays a role in the length of time the pilots
flew into weather. Furthermore, the significant difference in TAA hours and the lack of
significant differences for VFR and IFR hours indicates that qualitative differences in
flight training experiences may have played a role in whether or not pilots flew into
weather. Unsure of what exact differences exist in pilots' experience levels lend some
pilots to fly longer into degraded weather but differences exist and further research is
needed to fully understand this relationship. The significant differences in TAA hours
between the groups indicated the need to include this variable in the principle analysis.
Because TAA hours played a role in the length of time pilots flew into weather, an
ANCOVA was conducted with TAA as a covariate, allowing for the assessment of
motivation and timing of weather, absent the effects of TAA. The non-significant effect
for motivation indicated that motivation in this study did not have an effect on the length
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of time the pilots flew into weather. Individual differences could explain one reason why
no differences were found for motivation. The 20 dollar bonus payment may not have
been enough of a motivator for the externally motivated pilots to continue into degraded
weather longer than the internally motivated pilots.
Based on what the sunk-cost effect claims, it was expected that the pilots who
encountered weather late in a flight invested more resources than pilots who encountered
weather early in a flight. Further, it was anticipated that the EM pilots who encountered
weather late in the flight would continue longer into degraded weather, while the IM
pilots who encountered weather early in the flight would continue a shorter amount of
time. The results from this study found that the pilots that received weather early in the
flight continued longer into degraded weather than the pilots that received weather late in
the flight. The significant simple effects analysis revealed that the EM pilots continued
significantly longer than the IM pilot who encountered weather early in the flight, while
not differences were found in the length of time the EM and IM pilot flew into weather
when encountering weather late in the flight. A study conducted by Wiegmann, Goh and
O'Hare (2001) and the results from this study support these findings. Wiegmann, Goh
and O'Hare (2001) in a similar study instructed a group of pilots to fly a cross-country
flight where half received degrading weather early while the other half received
degrading weather late. The results from this study revealed that the pilots that
encountered weather early in the flight continued longer and farther into to weather than
the pilots that encountered weather late in the flight. These results do not support the
claims made by the sunk-cost effect, but are supported by the situation assessment

41

The Influence of Motivation

42

hypothesis, differences in perceptual processing, decision making, and cognitive
anchoring.
The situation assessment hypothesis states that pilots who encounter weather early
in the flight continue into weather because they do not accurately assess degrading
weather. This inaccurate assessment of degrading weather leads pilots to fly into weather
without realizing they are doing so (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). Just as the sunkcost effect is a possible explanation for why pilots fly into degrading weather, the
situation assessment hypothesis and the weather location effect are possible explanations
supported by the results found in this study of why pilots fly into weather.
It is understood that pilots with more experience should be more effective and
efficient in identifying degrading weather than pilots with less experience. Burian,
Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) found that pilots with less experience continued into weather
longer because they did not "trust" their perception of degrading weather and continued
flying "blindly" into degrading weather. In addition to experience in assessing degrading
weather, the location at which pilots encounter weather, the weather location effect,
influences the length of time pilots fly into weather. The degrading weather the pilots
encountered early in the flight contradicts what the pilots expected weather to be like
based upon reports received prior to takeoff. Because of this contradiction, the pilots
"look around" to resolve the disparity between the weather report previously obtained
and the degrading weather encountering early in the flight. This behavior to "look
around" may lead the pilots who encounter weather early in the flight to fly longer into
weather than the pilots who encounter weather late in the flight. The pilots that encounter
weather later in the flight assume that the weather report obtained before takeoff is
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outdated and make their decision based on the weather condition currently experiencing
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). The ability for the pilots to realize that the weather
report is outdated may contribute to less flight time into degrading weather than the pilots
who encounter weather early in the flight.
In addition to the situation assessment hypothesis, differences in perceptual
processes could explain why pilots who encountered weather early in the flight continued
into weather longer than the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight. It is easier
for pilots to perceive weather changes after a long period of exposure to consistent
weather than it is for pilots who have been exposed to consistent weather for a shorter
period of time. The pilots who encountered weather late in the flight were exposed to a
long period of constant weather which allowed the pilots to notice changes in degrading
weather quicker. On the other hand, the pilots who encountered weather early in the
flight had a shorter period of consistent weather to compare against the weather changes.
The less time the pilots are exposed to the weather conditions before the weather changes
occur may contribute to longer flight into degrading weather when deciding if the
weather conditions are degrading enough to divert (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002).
Differences in the pilots' decision making may contribute to flight into degrading
weather. Specifically, the differences that existed in the length of time the pilots who
continued and the pilots who diverted can be attributed to differences in-flight weatherrelated decision making. To investigate whether differences were present between the
pilots that continued and diverted, the likelihood rankings for the weather-related scripted
scenarios were analyzed from the FADM/JQ.
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For the responses on 7b, overall, the pilots ranked the option of telling Flight
Watch that they are too busy to give them their PIREP in marginal VFR conditions as an
unlikely course of action. More of the pilots that diverted ranked this option as an
unlikely course of action while some of the pilots that continue ranked this option as a
likely course of action. When the pilots encountered degrading weather, the pilots that
continued may have been more focused on what was going on in their environment and
trying to decide whether to continue and did not have the time to inform Flight Watch of
their PIREP. The pilots that diverted had already made the decision and were more likely
to give their PIREP to Flight Watch.
In the responses for 18c, the pilots that diverted ranked the option to enter the hold
in below weather minimums in hopes to land before the EFC time as an unlikely course
of action. With the pilots that continued, this response was ranked somewhere in the
middle between an unlikely course of action and a likely course of action. Furthermore,
more pilots that continued ranked this option as a likely course of action than the pilots
that diverted and more pilots that diverted ranked this option as an unlikely course of
action than the pilots that continued. These responses indicated that the pilots who
diverted were less likely to enter a hold and wait in compromising conditions than the
pilots that continued. The responses to these items indicate differences in weather-related
decision making while supporting the outcomes of this investigation.
For pilots to make the best possible decision under uncertainty, an accurate
assessment of the situation is required usually requiring the pilots to spend time assessing
the situation before making the decision. Any information the pilot gains prior to making
a decision may bias his or her decision in favor of that information. Madhavan and
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Wiegmann (2005) label this behavior as cognitive anchoring which has an effect on a
person's ability to make decisions under uncertainty. For example, when a person is
asked to estimate if Daytona Beach, Florida has less or more than 50,000 people and then
asked to estimate the actual number of people living in Daytona Beach. Their estimation
of the actual number of people living in Daytona Beach is closely related or "anchored"
to the original estimation on whether they though there were less than or more than
50,000 people (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). In this study, the pilots that received weather
early in the flight may have continued into weather longer than those who received
weather late in the flight because of cognitive anchoring.
How cognitive anchoring incorporates into Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model can
help explain why pilots in this study who encountered weather early in the flight
continued longer into weather than the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight.
Pilots gain information and create a hypothesis about the weather condition for the flight
from the weather report obtained prior to takeoff. The pilots use the weather information
obtained from the weather report as an "anchor" to make comparative assessments of the
weather conditions throughout the entire flight, the problem vigil stage. Specifically,
when degrading weather is encountered early in the flight the pilots are biased towards
the initial hypothesis or "anchor" established from the weather report. Because of this,
the pilots do not easily or quickly accept an alternative "anchor", the degraded weather,
but rather have a stronger tendency to favor the original anchor, the weather report. This
may lead pilots to fly into weather longer until the "anchor" is changed or according to
the situation assessment hypothesis the disparity is resolved. The pilots who encounter
weather late in the flight are less influenced by the "anchor" of the weather report
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because it is outdated and are more open to changing this "anchor". Thus, how pilots are
cognitively "anchored" may influence the length of time pilots fly into weather before
diverting. This may be compounded by that fact that pilots who encountered weather
early in the flight had more time to evaluate the situation before pressed to make the
decision, possibly leading to longer flight into degraded weather. The pilots who
received weather late in the flight were required to make the decision to continue or
divert much quicker than the pilots who received weather early in the flight (Goh and
Wiegmann, 2001a).
The limitations of this study included the use of a simulator, the familiarity with the
flight route, inconsistencies with the weather specifications and how the equipment could
display them, and the lack of influence the bonus payment had in the external motivation
condition. This study was conducted in a flight simulator rather than in an actual aircraft
and differences in the pilots' performance could exist between these two environments.
One of the risks with conducting research in a simulator is the possibility that the pilots
may have been "performing" for the investigator. This may not have been the case since
the purpose of the study was concealed until after the flight scenario was completed, but
this issue must not be dismissed. Since all the pilots were from Daytona Beach the flight
route from Daytona Beach to Gainesville may have been a familiar one. Since the flight
was in Florida the terrain was very flat allowing the pilots to descend to around 1500 feet
and continue flying to Gainesville. The combination of familiarity with the flight and the
level terrain may have had an influence on the number of pilots that continued the entire
way to the destination. One problem with the equipment is how the weather
specifications indicated in Microsoft Flight Simulator were not projected exactly as
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entered. Weather was perceived as better than what was actually indicated on the control
panel and presented in the weather manipulating section of Microsoft Flight Simulator.
Last, the bonus payment used for the extrinsic motivation condition was not effective in
motivating the pilots to continue to the destination. Some of the pilots may have viewed
the payment as insufficient to compromise the safety of the flight. Even with these
limitations, some of the pilots continued through degraded weather indicating the weather
was ambiguous enough the allow them to continue, while some of the pilots diverted
during the experiment indicating the weather conditions were bad enough to cause these
pilots to divert.
Conclusion
The statistics support that weather-related accidents are one of GA's primary safety
concerns, especially since many weather-related accidents are associated with fatalities.
Many factors encourage pilots to fly into degraded weather and the purpose of this study
was to assess how motivation and investment relate to the length of time pilots fly into
degraded weather. While the intent was to frame the investigation within the sunk-cost
effect, the findings point in another direction. Originally it was thought that the pilots
who encountered weather late in the flight would continue the longest into degraded
weather, but instead, through this study it was found that the pilots who received weather
early in the flight continued longer into degraded weather than the pilots who
encountered weather later. To understand why pilots fly into weather, decisions made in
weather scenarios were analyzed. The decision making analysis was conducted to better
understand how pilots make decisions to continue or divert into degraded weather, but
unfortunately, the findings do not fully explain why pilots fly into weather. It may prove
47
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beneficial to research what motivates pilots to make the decision to fly into weather.
Some motivational factors could include the situation assessment hypothesis, perceptual
processing differences, and differences in cognitive anchoring. In addition to
understanding how pilots perceive degrading weather (situation assessment hypothesis)
or where weather is encountered (weather location effect), the way in which pilots view
the decision to continue or divert against information he or she already knows, (cognitive
anchoring) may influence the length of time pilots fly into degraded weather. With better
understanding of these factors it may be possible to identify effective interventions to
reduce the number of pilots that fly into degraded weather with hopes of reducing the
accidents and fatality numbers associated with weather-related accidents.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form

I consent to participating in the research project entitled:
Flight Research for ADS-B Implementation
The principle investigator of the study is:
Jon French x 386-226-6384 frenc70f@erau.edu
The study will focus on the difference between relatively low flight
time and relatively high flight time pilots in their instrument scans,
particularly as it relates to glass instrument flight. It will utilize
the assets of the technically advanced aircraft performance (TAAP) lab
(LB374) simulators to establish the procedures and metrics that will be
transferred to the more sophisticated Flight Training Devices and then
to actual flight (Phase II). Thus, the study will consider, transfer
of training from flight simulators to FTD and actual flight.
I will be expected to arrive at my scheduled time over the 4 days in
which I am a participant in the evaluation of instrument scan. The
total time I will be needed should not exceed 2 hours the first day and
1.5 hours the 2-4th day. I will be asked to fly a C-182 simulator for
about 30-50 minutes and to fill out questionnaires for the remaining
time each day. All my results will be kept confidential and will not
be associated with my name.
I will be paid $150 for my participation
in the study.
The individual above, or their research assistants, have explained the
purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected
duration of my participation. Possible benefits of the study have been
described, as have alternative procedures, if such procedures are
applicable and available.
I WILL NOT DISCUSS THE METHODS OR CONDITIONS I EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER
PILOTS WHO MIGHT THEMSELVES BECOME PARTICIPANTS AS THIS COULD INFLUENCE
THEIR PERFORMANCE ADVERSELY.
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional
information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised
have been answered to my full satisfaction. Furthermore, I understand
that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue
participation in the study without prejudice to me.
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the
consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given
to me.
Name (please print) :
(Participant)

Date :

Signed:
(Participant)
Signed:
(Researcher/Assistant)
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Appendix B: Demographic Data Flight Performance I

DDFP-I
Demographics Data Flight Performance I
Thank you for participating in this evaluation. This form asks questions about your
piloting and computer experience. We will use this information to determine any factors
that might explain your proficiency in technologically advanced aircraft (TAA). Please
answer the following questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Name:
Sex: M F
Age:
Flight Licenses and certificates achieved:
(List each, the approximate date achieved, and years held, and if current. Use
additional paper if more room is needed.)
License/Certificate

Date achieved

Years held

Current?
Yes/NO

5. Please list any recurrency training you've received and the date.

6. Please list the types of aircraft you've flown general aviation and commercial
(FAA categories), and approximate dates and hours in each.
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7. Please list the types of military aircraft you've flown and approximate dates and
hours in each.

8. Approximate number of hours flown in VFR
9. Approximate number of hours flown in IFR
10. Approximate number of hours flown in TAA or (Technologically advanced
aircraft; i.e., "glass cockpit") like the Garmin 1000.
11. What types of glass instruments have you flown with?

12. List the airplanes you own or have owned (partnership or sole owner).
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Appendix C: Federal Aeronautical Decision Making / Judgment Questionnaire

DM/JQ:
Adapted From: Driskill, W.E., Weissmuller, J.J., Quebe, J.C., Hand, D.K. and Hunter, D.R (1998).
Evaluating the decision making skills of general aviation pilots. DOT/FAA/AM-98/7

This questionnaire is designed to assess pilot decision making and judgment. Please read
each of the following descriptions and indicate the risk of each option. Assume the
aircraft is a TAA.
1. You are flying an "Angel Flight" with a nurse and non-critical child patient to meet an
ambulance at a downtown regional airport. You filed VFR it is 11:00 P.M. on a clear
night when at 60 NM out you notice the ammeter reading zero and correctly deduce the
alternator has failed. Your best guess is that you have from 15 to 30 minutes of battery
power remaining. How likely are you to do the following?
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Declare an emergency, turn off all electrical
systems except for NAVCOM and transponder
and continue to the Regional Airport as planned.
b. Declare an emergency and divert to the
Planter's County Airport which is clearly visible
at 2 o'clock, 7 NM.
c. Declare an emergency, turn off all electrical
systems except for 1 NAVCOM, instrument
panel lights intercom and transponder and divert
to the Southside Business Airport which is 40
NM straight ahead.
d. Declare art emergency, turn off all electrical
systems except for 1 NAVCOM, instrument
panel light intercom and transponder and divert
to Draper Air Force Base which is 10 o'clock at
32 NM.
Airport
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2. You are preparing to enter the VFR traffic pattern at the Regional Airport and hear
the tower report winds from 280 at 15 knots ATC is vectoring traffic to the primary
8800 ft runways 35. A Piper Cherokee asks to use the 7753x150 runway 27. The
Cherokee is told the runway is not active, but to you it looks OK. You decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Accept clearance to runway 35 and
follow the traffic.
b. Ask to use runway 27.
c. Insist on using runway 27 stating that
the crosswinds are unsafe for you to use
runway 35.
d. Divert to the Southside Business
Airport where the runway is almost
directly aligned with the wind.
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3. To prepare for when marginal VFR weather makes it difficult to return to your home
airfield (uncontrolled), you practice in VFR conditions:
Highly
Unlikely

Highly
Likely

a. An unofficial locally devised arrival
to the pattern.
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b. Have devised your own arrival route
to the pattern or runway.
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c. Practice a published IFR approach.
d. Don't do anything.
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4. While en route you want to find out what is going on along the weather pattern you
observe ahead. You decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Call an airport tower below and ask.
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b. Call FSS and ask.
c. Find the ATC frequency, call and
ask them.
d. Identify an airplane ahead and ask
for a PIREP.

5. The weather is stuck in the summertime high mode with clear mornings, hazy
afternoons, puffy clouds scattered at 5500 feet AGL with visibility at 7 miles or more.
When you go cross country in these weather conditions you usually decide to:
Highly
Unlikely

Highly
Likely

a. Don't file but fly airways.
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b. File VFR and stay off airways.
c. File IFR
d. File VFR on airways as much as
possible.
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6. Take-off and en route weather arc VFR with a dry line scheduled through your
destination about your ETA. It may push some thunderstorms ahead of it so your weather
briefing ends with "VFR flight is not recommended" There are several good alternate
airfields along the route of flight and beyond your destination. You decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. File IFR and utilize weather radar on board
b. File VFR to an airport short of your
destination, land and let any weather pass over.
c. Delay your departure until the "VFR flight is
not recommended" statement is removed from
the forecast.
d. File VFR to your destination.
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7. The weather for departure and the first half of your four hour cross country was
slightly better than marginal VFR You made it off and have leveled at cruise altitude in
VFR conditions and are preparing to cheek in with Flight Watch You suspect they will
ask you for a PIREP to check their forecast. You decide to:
Highly
Unlikely
a. Calculate your drift, determine the
winds, make note of the cloud cover and
types, and note the OAT to be ready when
they ask.
b. Beg off- telling them you have your
hands full and can't take the time.
c. Expect to give at least your position,
cloud bases and tops, visibility and relate
any deviations between what you saw and
what was forecast.
d. Prepare to either confirm the accuracy of
their forecast or tell of the observable
differences.
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8. You have planned a four plus hour cross-country and the weather could easily force
you into rather undesirable routes which would take you over rough and desolate country.
To match the best weather and route combination, you decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
1 a. Select the route with which you feel the
most comfortable and have the weather
forecaster give you the forecast and if VFR is
not recommended, repeat this process until
you have a VFR route.
1 b. Tell the forecaster your departure point,
destination and have him select the best
route.
c. Give the forecaster three routes and have
him give you the weather for each then you
decide.
d. Delay the flight until you get VFR weather
over the primary route.
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9. Three of your closest friends have bought you a choice ticket and are paying for you to
rent this airplane and fly the four of you the 180 miles up to the university in the morning
for the "BIG" early afternoon football game, then back in the early evening. Another
friend will meet you at the college Airport and drive all of you to the game and back.
Departure weather was overcast 3000 ft ceiling with 5 miles and light haze with
temperatures in the 60s. Pilots flying the same route reported enroute weather as
occasional 1500 ft ceilings with 3 miles visibility and scattered showers. The College
Airport is clear with bright sunshine. Forty-five miles from the College Airport you have
descended to 1000 feet staying just below the ceilings and encounter rain dropping
visibility to under 3 miles. The terrain is flat farmland with no published obstacles above
250 ft tall. You decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Remain under the clouds, keep visual
contact with the ground and scoot through.
b. Do a 180 and return home.
c. Divert to the Madison County Airport
located at 7 o'clock 50 NM and wait for the
worst weather to pass.
d. Put it to a vote.
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10. You are halfway in a two-hour late evening flight from the Regional Airport cruising
at 4500 feet over a route with an MEA of 1500 feet. The weather has been clear as
forecast when without any warning you find yourself in a cloud. You are not instrument
rated. You decide to:
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Continue straight ahead for a while and see what
happens.
b. Make a 180-degree level turn and get out.
c. Start a wings level shallow descent to get under
it.
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d. Start a wings level climb to get on top.

11. It had rained all day, but the font pushed south of you and cleared the skies. You are
out with two friends on a sight seeing trip to the hills 40 miles away and plan to be back
before dark. With sunset still an hour away you notice ground fog beginning to form.
You decide to:
Highly
Unlikely
a. Apply full power and race back to the
home Airport.

Highly
Likely
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b. Call Flight Watch and cruise back home.
c. Call on your home airfield's CATF to
see if anyone is there and can tell you what
the weather is doing.
d. Go directly to an Airport you know is
closer than your home Airport, land and
find out what the weather is doing.
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12. You are VFR at 5500' MSL, in your new SR22, completed an instrument proficiency
check two years ago, have three actual instrument approaches and two simulated
instrument approaches in the past six calendar months, holding procedures two months
ago, and practiced intercepting and tracking courses this month. You inadvertently enter
IMC.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Contact center and request an IFR
clearance and continue to your planned
destination.
b. Enter a 30° bank turn to make a 180°
heading change to exit IMC conductions.
c. Establish straight and level flight, engage
the autopilot to hold Heading and Altitude,
reset the Heading to initiate 180° turn.
d. Contact center and request an IFR
clearance and request a 180° heading
change to exit IMC conductions.
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13. You are VFR at 7500'MSL, in your SR22, returning to Duluth for a recurrent
training course, proceeding GPS direct from KGFK (Grand Forks, ND) to KDLH (Duluth
Intl) with vectors to ILS09 (PYKLA transition). 60nm west of Duluth you see a line of
thunderstorm running from just south of your route of flight toward the northeast moving
northeast. You disengage the autopilot and turn to a heading of 130° to maneuver to the
south of the thunderstorms, after 15 minutes ATC advises you that a thunderstorm is
moved toward Duluth from the southwest.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Continue on you current heading for another
10 miles and then proceed direct to PYKLA and
hold until the thunderstorm is out of the Duluth
area.
b. Engage autopilot, select nearest airport page
on your GNS430, select KGPZ and search for
needed information on Grand Rapids, MN and
select an available approach. Choose and
program GNS430 for coupled approach into
KGPZ.
c. Press the Direct function on your GNS430,
enter KGPZ, turn the airplane to the DTK
course displayed, once established inbound to
KGPZ, press PROC and select an approach to
Grand Rapids, MN.
d. Engage autopilot, select nearest airport page
on your GNS430, select desired airport, select
Direct function to that airport, search for needed
information and approach options, program
approach, select, and activate appropriate leg.
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14. You are IFR proceeding direct to PYKLA (FAF for the ILS rwy 09 at KDLH) with
the autopilot on with NAV and ALT functions on and you have GPS2 set in PFD Nav
Source when the PDF fails.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Regain aircraft control using the backup
instruments, turn off the autopilot, and declare
an emergency and request radar vectors to
PYKLA from Minneapolis Cntr.
b. Regain aircraft control using the backup
instruments, turn off the autopilot, and request
radar vectors to PYKLA from Minneapolis Cntr.
Select desired approach and appropriate
VOR/LOC frequencies.
c. Regain aircraft control using the backup
instruments, select NAV page 1 for course
guidance to PYKLA on GPS2, select FPL,
PYKLA, and Direct on GPS1 and activate,
select AP, NAV, ALT on the autopilot, advise
Minneapolis Cntr you have lost your primary
flight instruments, now program GPS1 for
desired approach and appropriate VOR/LOC
frequencies.
d. Regain aircraft control using the backup
instruments, select Direct on GPS1, enter
PYKLA and activate, select AP, NAV, ALT on
the autopilot, advise Minneapolis Cntr you have
lost your primary flight instruments, now
program GPS1 with desired approach and
appropriate VOR/LOC frequencies.
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15. You are IMC on an IFR flight to Duluth, when the attitude data is replaced with a
large red X, the Wind vector data is replaced with dashes, and heading data is replaced
with a large red X. You correctly identify the PFD is not receiving valid attitude and
heading data.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
1 a. Use your back-up instruments for attitude
and heading for the remainder of the flight,
use the MFD to navigate to VMC conditions,
and land at an airport 10 miles from your
planned destination.
1 b. Use your back-up instruments for attitude
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use
your GPS 1 to navigate to your destination, and
flytheGPS21 approach.
1 c. Use your back-up instruments for attitude
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use
the GPS1 or GPS2 to navigate to VMC
conditions, and land at the nearest airport.
d. Use your back-up instruments for attitude
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use
the GPS1 to navigate to VMC conditions,
select the GPSS mode and autopilot, and land
at the nearest VMC airport.
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16. You are IMC on an IFR flight to Duluth, when the heading data is replaced with a
large red X and the Wind vector data is replaced with dashes. You correctly identify the
PFD is not receiving valid heading data.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Use your back-up instruments for
heading for the remainder of the flight,
use the GPS1 to navigate to your
planned destination, select the GPSS
mode and autopilot, and land using the
desired approach.
b. Use your back-up instruments for
heading for the remainder of the flight,
use the MFD to navigate to VMC
conditions, and land at nearest VMC
airport.
c. Use your back-up instruments for
heading for the remainder of the flight,
use your GPS2 to navigate to your
destination, and fly the GPS21
approach.
d. Use your back-up instruments for
heading for the remainder of the flight,
use the GPS1 or GPS2 to navigate to
VMC conditions, and land at the
nearest airport.
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17. You just departed Colorado Springs to the West. You are fully loaded and in solid
IMC with freezing drizzle. As you climb ATC gives you a vector to intercept the airway
and maintain 7,000 for traffic. On reaching altitude you are concerned about the rising
terrain. You call departure control and ask when you can expect to climb. There is no
response. Anti-Ice System has been on since take off.
Highly
Unlikely
a. Switch on the TKS de-ice system, squawk
7600, and continue as per your flight plan.
b. Declare an emergency and return to Colorado
Springs.
c. Trouble-shoot the radio

Highly
Likely
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d. Squawk 7700 and divert to your alternate.
e. Switch on the TKS de-ice system and divert
to your alternate.
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18. ATIS is reporting below minimums at your destination and you are given holding
instructions with an EFC time one hour away. You estimate that you have fuel for one
hour and 15 minutes on board. Your passenger insists that you hold as long as you can
because he has an appointment that he cannot afford to miss.
Highly
Likely

Highly
Unlikely
a. Ask ATC for priority.
b. Call Flight Watch on 122.0 for additional
weather in the area before making any
decision.
c. Enter the hold and hope that ATC can
work you in sooner than the EFC time.
d. Request clearance to your alternate
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19. After holding for 15 minutes you elect to proceed to your alternate, which is 45
minutes away and is reporting VMC. You receive a clearance and depart the hold. ATC
calls you 15 minutes after you leave the hold to tell you that Approach has an open slot
and could take you now if you would like to return.
Highly
Unlikely
1 a. You accept the offer and are given a vector
for the Approach.
1 b. You are cutting it too close and elect to
proceed to your alternate
c. You ask for vectors to a closer airport.
d. You ask ATC to stand-by while you
review the situation and your status before
making a final decision.
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Appendix D: Early Weather Scenario
KDAB-KGNV VFR
42 minute flight and weather was encountered 12 minutes into flight
Simulator Settings:
MFD declutter -2
TOPO: OFF
TERRAIN: ON
SET PFD NAV to NAV 1
360 HSI
DME: ON
BRGl:ON
SET ENGINE DISPLAY ON MFD
The investigator briefed the participant as follows:
1. You are departing KDAB on a VFR flight to KGNV. You are delivering organs
from Halifax hospital, to the University of Florida for a liver transplant.
2. You have planned to go VFR at 4500 (see page 3) feet with flight following. The
forecasted weather along the route is VFR. Your call sign is "Riddle Life Flight
321".
3. You are unable to program anything on neither the MFD nor the PFD but you can
use the VOR navigation aides.
4. A sectional of Jacksonville will be provided to you in the simulator.
Departure time 1400z
KDAB 011353Z 29013KT 10SM SCT080 23/15 A29.92
KGNV011353Z 21012KT9SM SCT012 BKN070 23/21 A29.92
Initial Conditions:
Aircraft running on Runway 25 at KDAB
Weather set to match ATIS at KDAB
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Daytona Beach ATIS information:
KDAB A TIS information Alpha
1353 Zulu Observation
Wind 290 at 13
Visibility 10
Ceiling 8000 scattered
Temperature 23, dew point 15
Altimeter 29.92
Landing and departing runways 25R and 25L
Contact clearance delivery on 119.3 prior to taxi
Advise on initial contact you have information Alpha
Riddle Life Flight 321, Daytona Beach Clearance. Maintain VFR at or below 3000
Departure Frequency 125.8, squawk 1234
Riddle Life Flight 321, runway 25R. Maintain runway heading. Clearedfor takeoff
Start timer to measure total flight time and time of weather events.
Passing 800 feet— Riddle Life Flight 321, turn right heading 290, contact departure.
Riddle Life Flight 321, radar contact. Climb to requested altitude, resume own
navigation to Gainesville.
10 minutes after takeoff
Riddle Life Flight 321, contact Jacksonville center on 125.30
Riddle Life Flight, roger radar contact. Maintain VFR proceed to Gainesville.
We are now simulating radio transmitter failure. When the participant makes radio
calls to ATC the person acting like ATC will ignore these calls, but continue to make
radio transmissions to other traffic.
Make random radio transmissions to other traffic throughout the rest of the flight.
Subject recognizes lost communications after minutes

MIN

Gradual degradation of weather:
1. 12 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 5 miles in haze and ceiling
to 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base
2. 13 minutes after departure change ceiling at from 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base to
5000 (6/8) broken cloud base.
3. 14 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 3 miles and ceiling to 5000
(7/8) broken cloud base.
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ATIS only receivable after passing Palatka (28J)
He should be about 25 miles or less from GNV when he calls for ATIS.
Once pilot dials in ATIS 127.15 you can make this reading.
KGNV ATIS
Information Bravo
1443 Zulu Special observation
Wind 290 at 13
Visibility 4BR, -SHRA
SA Y 4mile visibility and mist andfor Shra SA Y light rain
and showers.
Ceiling 1500 Broken. 7000 Overcast
Temperature 23, dew point 23
Altimeter 29.87
Landing and departing runway 29
Advise on initial contact you have information Bravo.
Weather change when passing over Palatka:
1. Increase in-flight visibility to 5 miles
2. Change ceiling from 5000 (7/8) broken to 7000 overcast.
3. Set rain to moderate.
Weather change 10 miles from Gainesville:
1. Add clouds at 1500 scattered.
2. Lower visibility to 3 miles.

Continued:
The participant did not divert and landed at Gainesville
Diverted:
The participant diverted

minutes after takeoff.
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Appendix E: Late Weather Scenario
KDAB-KGNV VFR
42 minute flight and weather was encountered 30 minutes into flight
Simulator Settings:
MFD declutter -2
TOPO: OFF
TERRAIN: ON
SET PFD NAV to NAV 1
360 HSI
DME: ON
BRGl:ON
SET ENGINE DISPLAY ON MFD
The investigator briefed the participant as follows:
1. You are departing KDAB on a VFR flight to KGNV. You are delivering organs
from Halifax hospital, to the University of Florida for a liver transplant.
2. You have planned to go VFR at 4500 (see page 3) feet with flight following. The
forecasted weather along the route is VFR. Your call sign is "Riddle Life Flight
321".
3. You are unable to program anything on neither the MFD nor the PFD but you can
use the VOR navigation aides.
4. A sectional of Jacksonville will be provided to you in the simulator.
Departure time 1400z
KDAB 011353Z 29013KT 10SM SCT080 23/15 A29.92
KGNV 011353Z 21012KT 9SM SCT012 BKN070 23/21 A29.92
Initial Conditions:
Aircraft running on Runway 25 at KDAB
Weather set to match ATIS at KDAB

73

The Influence of Motivation

74

Daytona Beach ATIS information:
KDAB ATIS information Alpha
1353 Zulu Observation
Wind 290 at 13
Visibility 10
Ceiling 8000 scattered
Temperature 23, dew point 15
Altimeter 29.92
Landing and departing runways 25R and 25L
Contact clearance delivery on 119.3 prior to taxi
Advise on initial contact you have information Alpha
Riddle Life Flight 321, Daytona Beach Clearance. Maintain VFR at or below 3000
Departure Frequency 125.8, squawk 1234
Riddle Life Flight 321, runway 25R. Maintain runway heading. Clearedfor takeoff.
Start timer to measure total flight time and time of weather events.
Passing 800 feet— Riddle Life Flight 321, turn right heading 290, contact departure.
Riddle Life Flight 321, radar contact. Climb to requested altitude, resume own
navigation to Gainesville.
10 minutes after takeoff
Riddle Life Flight 321, contact Jacksonville center on 125.30
Riddle Life Flight, roger radar contact. Maintain VFR proceed to Gainesville.
We are now simulating radio transmitter failure. When the participant makes radio
calls to ATC the person acting like ATC will ignore these calls, but continue to make
radio transmissions to other traffic.
Make random radio transmissions to other traffic throughout the rest of the flight.
Subject recognizes lost communications after minutes

MIN

Gradual degradation of weather:
1. 30 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 5 miles in haze and ceiling
to 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base
2. 31 minutes after departure change ceiling at from 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base to
5000 (6/8) broken cloud base.
3. 32 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 3 miles and ceiling to 5000
(7/8) broken cloud base.
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ATIS only receivable after passing Palatka (28J)
He should be about 25 miles or less from GNV when he calls for ATIS.
Once pilot dials in ATIS 127.15 you can make this reading.
KGNV ATIS
Information Bravo
1443 Zulu Special observation
Wind 290 at 13
Visibility 4BR, -SHRA
SA Y 4mile visibility and mist andfor Shra SA Y light rain
and showers.
Ceiling 1500 Broken. 7000 Overcast
Temperature 23, dew point 23
Altimeter 29.87
Landing and departing runway 29
Advise on initial contact you have information Bravo.
Weather change when passing over Palatka:
1. Increase in-flight visibility to 5 miles
2. Change ceiling from 5000 (7/8) broken to 7000 overcast.
3. Set rain to moderate.
Weather change 10 miles from Gainesville:
1. Add clouds at 1500 scattered.
2. Lower visibility to 3 miles.
If the participant flew over Palatka before 30 minutes had passed the Palatka weather
changes were not implemented. The participants received the weather changes 30
minutes into the flight and if continued to the destination received the weather changes 10
miles from Gainesville with rain set to moderate.

Continued:
The participant did not divert and landed at Gainesville
Diverted:
The participant diverted

minutes after takeoff.
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